Unions and Detroit

In reference to the auto bailout that the House passed last night and appears to be stalled in the Senate, there’s been heavy invocation by Republicans of the roughly $70 per hour that Detroit ostensibly pays UAW workers. This is drawn in contrast to the $49 per hour of labor costs that other domestic manufacturers like Toyota and Honda, the idea being that if only it weren’t for the pesky unions, America’s automakers would be in much better shape. David Leonhardt explains the fallacy in the New York Times. Read the whole thing, but basically, the calculation is made by dividing total labor costs by hours worked, which sounds reasonable until you realize that “labor costs” include the pensions and benefits paid to retired workers. Having been established for a considerably longer period of time, Detroit has amassed a significantly greater number of retirees than than the nascent foreign car makers. So much greater is this cost, that with legacy costs excluded, UAW workers make only $10 more per hour than their counterparts (which go predominately to expanded benefits). And verily, there is still a difference, but Leonhardt explains:

So here’s a little experiment. Imagine that a Congressional bailout effectively pays for $10 an hour of the retiree benefits. That’s roughly the gap between the Big Three’s retiree costs and those of the Japanese-owned plants in this country. Imagine, also, that the U.A.W. agrees to reduce pay and benefits for current workers to $45 an hour — the same as at Honda and Toyota.

Do you know how much that would reduce the cost of producing a Big Three vehicle? Only about $800.

That’s because labor costs, for all the attention they have been receiving, make up only about 10 percent of the cost of making a vehicle. An extra $800 per vehicle would certainly help Detroit, but the Big Three already often sell their cars for about $2,500 less than equivalent cars from Japanese companies, analysts at the International Motor Vehicle Program say. Even so, many Americans no longer want to own the cars being made by General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.

So, in conclusion, higher labor costs associated with unionized employees do increase cost, but not nearly as much as anti-labor Republicans would have you believe. What’s more, roughly 50 percent of these costs go to to paying health benefits to retired workers, which underscores the importance of comprehensive health care reform. Or as a conservative might suggest, cutting the capital gains tax.

More Pool Draining

So it seems the Treasury plan to subsidize new mortgages at 4.5 percent is every bit as dumb as I first thought. Commenter “Bri”, who have I have it on good authority knows something about the mortgage business, said:

If it goes thru [sic] as solely available to purchase loans, it would in effect be a builder bailout. Including refinance mortgages would help some who are having trouble making their payments, and others who might get cashout to use (spend) toward some other purchase (stimulate the economy). I have faith in this getting screwed up.

Indeed, and according to the New York Times:

But the cheap mortgages would be available only for people buying houses, not the roughly 50 million families that already have mortgages and would want to refinance at a lower rate.

As a result, the plan offers no direct relief to the millions of people who face foreclosure because they took out exotic mortgages that they could not afford. Nor would the plan offer any benefit to people who have stayed current on their mortgages and would simply be interested in taking advantage of a lower rate. As envisioned by Treasury officials, homeowners who now pay 6 percent would be watching new neighbors arrive whose monthly payments were almost one-third lower.

Right, so the plan doesn’t include provisions for mortgage refinancing, which at once is unfair to those who can afford their mortgages and more importantly, does nothing directly to address imminent, and perhaps not even medium-term foreclosures. So in effect, it’s a short term boon for prospective home buyers and home builders, which might make sense if the housing market were actually under valued. In fact, there’s no reason to believe this. What’s more, in the long term, it’s hard to see how this would do anything but delay the inevitable. If the government doesn’t continue to subsidize loans at 4.5 percent, presumably rates will return to market levels, driving down housing demand and thus lowering housing values yet again.

Perhaps there’s some short term imperative that would make this plan the correct policy choice, but it’s worth returning to the cause of the crisis: the worthlessness of collaterized mortgage debt vis-a-vis widespread foreclosure. The most straightforward way to address the problem is thus stemming the tide of foreclosures by directly intervening in troubled mortgages, not artificial invigoration of the housing market which may or may not address the root of the crisis at some point in the future.

Again, I invite any experts to comment.

Throw a Lifevest

Now, maybe I’m just not smart enough to understand this, and I’m happy to be corrected, but why in god’s name is Hank Paulson proposing a plan that would finance new mortgages at 4.5 percent?

Treasury officials told the [National Association of] Realtors that the plan could be a more effective way to help homeowners than focusing efforts solely on borrowers who are struggling to meet their monthly payments, the sources said. Democratic lawmakers have been advocating a proposal to modify the mortgages of distressed homeowners.

I’m assuming the logic is that by artificially reinvigorating the housing market (sound familiar?), home values rise, and homeowners who can’t afford their mortgages will no longer be “underwater” (meaning their homes will no longer be worth less than their mortgages), these folks will now sell their homes, and in doing so, will stave off further foreclosures. This makes a certain degree of sense, but how long would something like this take? What guarantees their homes will be bought? Is there a more circuitous method to be taken? If the point is to help distressed homeowners, wouldn’t it be a lot faster to follow Sheila Bair’s lead and just restructure troubled mortgages?

Of course, if the point is to stimulate one of the industries most culpable for this mess with a possible side effect of helping distressed homeowners, then this sounds bitchin’. Pitching it as an aid to homeowners though is like suggesting that the best way to save a drowning person is by draining the pool.

I know there are a few people involved in this industry that read this blog, so feel free to leave your thoughts in comments.

Short Memory

Not that it should surprise anyone, George W. Bush was warned about the financial crisis as early as 2005:

In 2005, faced with ominous signs the housing market was in jeopardy, bank regulators proposed new guidelines for banks writing risky loans. Today, in the midst of the worst housing recession in a generation, the proposal reads like a list of what-ifs:

-Regulators told bankers exotic mortgages were often inappropriate for buyers with bad credit.

-Banks would have been required to increase efforts to verify that buyers actually had jobs and could afford houses.

-Regulators proposed a cap on risky mortgages so a string of defaults wouldn’t be crippling.

-Banks that bundled and sold mortgages were told to be sure investors knew exactly what they were buying.

-Regulators urged banks to help buyers make responsible decisions and clearly advise them that interest rates might skyrocket and huge payments might be due sooner than expected.

Not surprisingly, George doesn’t seem to have any memory of this:

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: You know, we anticipated some issues revolving around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and early in my administration called for a regulator, on the knowledge that an implied government guarantee could cause, and eventually did cause, the agency to become excessive in its lending practices, which eventually was a part of the financial meltdown.

And I can remember sitting in the Roosevelt Room with Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke and others, and they said to me that if we don’t act boldly, Mr. President, we could be in a depression greater than the Great Depression.

GIBSON: When was that?

BUSH: That was, I would say, five weeks, four weeks after we began to deal with some — like AIG…

Posted without comment.

Correct Me If I’m Wrong, But..

Wasn’t this the original idea behind the TARP?

Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke is finally taking a step that Paulson won’t, and spending $600 billion to revive the U.S. housing market. $100 billion will be designated to buy the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and another $500 billion to buy mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie Mae. According to the Fed, the program will be conducted “through a series of competitive auctions,” thereby establishing a price for some of the unpriced toxic assets kicking around those institutions alongside their more credit-worthy holdings.

It’s a Lonely Road

Justin Fox at Time has an interesting take on who Detroit hasn’t been shown the love.

Still, I wonder if there aren’t also some other factors at work in the relatively hostile reaction to the Detroit Three. Most Americans simply no longer identify with the domestic auto industry (or with the states of Michigan and Ohio). To the Southerners who now make up the core constituency of the Republican Party, it’s a bunch of coddled, unionized workers trying to get handouts that the South’s auto industry (Toyota, Hyundai, Nissan, Mercedes, BMW …) doesn’t need. To the coastal urbanites and suburbanites who now make up the core constituency of the Democratic Party, it’s an industry that makes crappy big cars and fights against higher fuel efficiency standards. And to the business press it’s the worst thing of all: a trio of companies that are neither exciting nor financially successful.

As sort of glib as this sounds, it’s actually a bit compelling. Obviously the reason Detroit has been denied access to TARP funds has more to do with the fact that the economy simply needs the finance sector to function than anything else, but it sure doesn’t help that the Big Three are pretty universally reviled by outsiders.

Christmas Comes Early

Well, there’s been a deal reached on the CitiGroup bailout, and people are pissed. The basic terms:

In short: (a) Citi gets another $27 billion on the same terms as the first $25 billion, except that the interest rate is now 8% instead of 5%, and there is a cap on dividends of $0.01 per share per quarter; and (b) the government (Treasury, FDIC, Fed) agrees to absorb 90% of losses above $29 billion on a $306 billion slice of Citi’s assets, made up of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities. (If triggered, some of that guarantee will be provided as a loan from the Fed.) There is also a warrant to buy up to $2.7 billion worth of common stock (I presume) at a staggeringly silly price of $10.61 per share (Citi closed at $3.77 on Friday).

In addition, there will be no management changes and according to the NYT, “the preferred shares will pay an 8 percent dividend and will slightly erode the value of shares held by investors.” Seems like a pretty sweet deal for Citi and Citi’s shareholders to me. Meanwhile, the government has done absolutely nothing to restructure mortgages our bailout homeowners, whose instability is what’s causing the government to guarantee $270 billion in Citi’s “troubled” assets in the first place. If you really want to get upset, read yesterday’s article in the Times about how Citi got here in the first place.

UAW Decadence?

In a prior post today, I offhandedly criticized Mitt Romney for being too quick to assign blame to the UAW for Detroit’s problems. Ezra Klein channels Jonathan Cohn to get past the myth that UAW workers have the sinecure of a lifetime.

The $70 an hour came from dividing total compensation costs by the current workforce. But of course, lots of those compensation costs are attached — or were attached, before last year’s UAW concessions — to retirees. The truth is that current workers make about $24 an hour, plus another $10 in compensation. That’s about $60,000 a year, with good benefits. It’s a solid, middle class life. A helluva lot less than Joe the Plumber pulled in. But the $70 number isn’t tossed around because it’s accurate. It’s deployed because it’s useful. It recasts the story of the American auto industry as a morality tale in which greedy unions sit as the villain.

Now, this is hardly to suggest that the UAW doesn’t complicate life for Detroit. Indeed, one of the reasons that foreign car makers based in the United States like Toyota have stayed ahead of the curve is the basing plants in Southern “Right to Work” states which make unionizing all but impossible. Whether or not you think that’s a good thing is certainly up for debate, but the UAW shouldn’t be set up as a straw man when the problem was a staid business strategy.

Let The Bodies Hit the Floor

Via Ryan Avent, we learn that the Obama team is considering my (and Ryan’s) preferred shape of any Detroit bailout:

President-Elect Barack Obama’s transition team is exploring a swift, prepackaged bankruptcy for automakers as a possible solution to the industry’s financial crisis, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Obama’s team has already contacted at least one bankruptcy- law firm to say that Daniel Tarullo, a professor at Georgetown University’s law school who heads Obama’s economic policy working group, would call to discuss the workings of a so-called prepack, according to this person.

This really makes the most sense. In the first place, there’s simply no reason to believe that $25 billion would in one fell swoop transform Detroit into the forward looking companies they need to be. I’m inclined to believe Mitt Romney — even if he’s quick to finger the UAW — that this was first a crises of management and poor vision. Sure, the credit crisis had made acute Detroit’s problems, but there’s no guarantee they wouldn’t have emerged at some point later. If the government agrees to guarantee solvency during Chapter 11, it should be a cost effective solution that addresses some of the root problems directly.

Besides, I hear this Dan Tarullo guy is known to have progeny with good taste in internet reading.

Pile Up

Since I’m not paid to watch CSPAN, I really have no clue what’s happening in the hearings on an auto industry bailout other than its prospects were dimming, and that verily, the Big Three CEOs all flying separately on private jets probably wasn’t the right message to send. Anyway, if some sort of bailout does go forward — I’m a fan of some sort of government assured Chapter 11 — an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle irons out a few good provisions.

If Washington is going to give yet another loan-guarantee bailout to Detroit automakers, then the price should include requiring the car manufacturers to drop their four-year-long legal assault against global warming laws in California and three other states (Vermont, Rhode Island and New Mexico), as well as a requirement to develop and deliver hybrids, clean diesels and other highly fuel-efficient vehicles.

Indeed, if the Big Three intend to argue that their future security aligns with the public good, they should be happy to adopt other measures that also align with the public good. Further, it’s important that any provisions focus on these sorts of realignments rather than moralizing executive pay. The salaries of CEOs are not the cause of Detroit’s maladies.

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